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Abstract
Using cross-section Google search data implemented by Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) to
capture racial hate in every single state of the United States, we found a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between racism and corruption in the three branches of government,
specially the Judicial branch. Since the termination of the Civil War, states that used to
perform slavery as an economic activity started to discriminate the African-American minor-
ity and harm their fundamental rights through sentences in local courts. Additionally, 1%
increase in the estimated racial hate decreases the probability to stay in the lowest levels of
perceived corruption and increases the chances up to 2% to pass to a “very Common” level
of corruption.
Resumen
Usando datos de bu´squeda de Google de corte transversal implementado por Stephens-
Davidowitz (2014) para capturar el odio racial en cada estado de los Estados Unidos, en-
contramos una relacio´n positiva y significativa entre racismo y corrupcio´n en las tres ramas
de poder gubernamental, especialmente en la rama judicial. Desde la terminacio´n de la gue-
rra civil norteamericana, los estados que permit´ıan la esclavitud como actividad econo´mica
comenzaron a discriminar a la minor´ıa Afroamericana y violar sus derechos fundamentales
por medio de sentencias en las cortes locales. Adicionalmente, un 1 % de incremento en el
odio racial estimado disminuye la probabilidad de permanecer en los niveles menores de co-
rrupcio´n percibida e incrementa las posibilidades hasta de un 2 % de pasar a un alto nivel
de corrupcio´n.
JEL Code: C25, D63, D73, H73, J15, J78
Keywords: Corruption, Racism, Government, Ordered Probit
∗Escuela de Economı´a y Finanzas. Universidad EAFIT. e-mail:amesaos@eafit.edu.co
†Universidad EAFIT. e-mail:cgomezt1@eafit.edu.co
1
1. Introduction
In 1865, the reunification of the North American nation began, and so, the predom-
inance of the northern states’ ideas in the US constitution. However, those forced insti-
tutional changes in the southern states only prevailed until the moment when the Union
forces made their presence in that region to enforce the new laws. When the troops with-
drew in the 1870’s, the south returned to its old-established ideas by forbidding the vote
for people of colour and denying their civil rights obtained after the termination of the civil
war (Naidu, 2012). Additionally, the retro activation of the former southern non-formal
institutions impeded the peaceful racial coexistence in the region and, through organiza-
tions such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Order of White Knights, the white and Protestant
population infused hatred to the minorities in those places, especially to the African and
African-American citizens.
The educational system in the South could neither follow the same path of unification
of the rest of the country. Segregated schools, a product of racial hate in secessionist states,
provided poorer education for black people compared to the white ones, which impeded
the African-American habitants good and well-paid jobs (Margo, 1990). Therefore, a black
minority had no influence on political, social and economic decisions in the southern states.
Nowadays, the consequences of these non-formal institutions, established during the
period of segregation, are implicitly evident, particularly in the Southern states what were
part of the confederate coalition in the civil war. Recent newspaper reports of police
brutality against the black population and consequent protests against the impunity of
those crimes suppose descriptive evidence of the prevalence of racism in the United States.
And, hence, continues to contribute to the increase of corruption levels across the country.
By way of example, that supports the previous supposition, is the murder of Michael
Brown, an African-American of 18 years’ old, who was unarmed in the moment he was
shot in 2014 by a white police officer called Darren Wilson in St Louis, Missouri. Later
that year, the St. Louis County Grand Jury decided not to indict the police officer, which
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caused a great number of pacific and violent protests in several states of the country.
According to the previous context of racism in the United States, it is feasible to sup-
pose that some of the acts and determinations in the executive, legislative and especially
judicial branch have been historically focused on benefit white population and, accordingly,
allows the predominance of the segregationist institutions, particularly in the South. If
this socially problematic situation remains, it is possible to conjecture that states with
higher levels of racial hate, that leads to corruption, which can be one of the consequences
of “extractive” institutions, may not be able to achieve the same economic development
as their less corrupt and more institutional inclusive peers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008;
Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000). Moreover, inequality and poverty levels are higher in more
corrupt territories (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Therme, 2001).
The present research attempts to prove the positive relationship between racial hate
and corruption in the United States, particularly in the judicial branch, even after ending
the civil war and after the abolition of segregation laws in the past century (Jetter, Mesa-
Osorio, 2016). It also seeks to clarify, with quantitative validation, the channels whereby
this correlation exist. There is descriptive and historical literature which allows concluding
that the government’s branch where the effect of racial intolerance on corruption percep-
tion is more noticeable, is the judicial branch; since is the closest government branch to
the civilians, and is the branch that most easily can infringe the rights of the people.
This paper is organized as follows. Initially, the next section summarizes the previous
research and evidence on the matter. Then, section 3 describes the cross-section data by
state. Section 4 defines the econometric methodology. Section 5 interpret and analyze
the result of the estimations. Finally, section 6 presents the concluding remarks of this
research.
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2. Literature Review
Corruption has been a main economic and social problem which began to be widely
studied since the end of last century with the research of Paolo Mauro in 1995. Based on
subjective indices of bureaucracy and efficiency of the judicial system, the study proved the
inverse relationship between corruption and the level of investment in countries (Mauro,
1995), which also would produce lower economic growth in the long term (Mauro 1995;
Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000; Mo, 2001).
Other studies concluded that countries that high corruption in a country leads to in-
crease the level of inequality and corruption (Gupta et al., 2001; Justesen & Bjornskov,
2014). Besides, territories with greater protestant tradition, advanced economies and
higher trade openness experience lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000).
Different approaches, focused on testing the causes of corruption in the United States,
have concluded that less educated states, with greater ethnic division and smaller income
level, are more susceptible to suffer higher levels of corruption (Glaeser, 2006). Effective
separation of governance of political plurality in every state government is, as well, related
to low levels of corruption (Alt & Lassen, 2008). More recent studies have found that the
distance between the state capitals and the most populated areas is responsible for the
different levels of corruption in each state (Campante & Do, 2014).
Emphasizing in acts of racial discrimination that are related to cases of corruption,
several works have revealed how this relation is represented in judicial sentences. Alesina
& La Ferrara (2014) found that local courts are more severe in cases where someone part
of a minority is accused. In addition, they concluded that the effect of racial prejudice is
driven exclusively by the southern states. In cases where there are no African Americans
on the jury, black defendants were sentenced 81% of the time, while white defendants
were sentenced only 66% of the time. Nevertheless, when there was at least one African
American representative on the jury, black defendants were sentenced 71% of the time,
while the sentences to white defendants increased to 73% of the time (Anwar, Bayer &
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Hjalmarsso, 2012).
Such sentences disparities can be also explained by prosecutor’s initial accusation and
the use of minimum mandatory sentences. Rehavi & Starr (2014) discovered that in
federal sentences, African American defendant received sentences 10% longer that White
defendant because the prosecutors used the minimum mandatory sentences 1.75 times
more in black defendants than White ones. Those previous studies, although they are
interesting and revealing, does not provide the national problem and real implications
across the entire country.
3. Data Description
The focus of this research is to prove, either, the actual relationship between an ap-
proximation of racial hate or racism, from the white majority to the African American
minority by state in the United States, and the level of state corruption perception from
that country. We follow a dataset similar to the one used by Jetter & Mesa-Osorio (2016).
To capture a very ambiguous term such as racial hate, we are going to employ data
collected from Seth Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) of weighted Google search among the
2004-2007 period, that reflects socially sensitive behaviors like racial intolerance of indi-
viduals against other races. The Google searches used to express this behavior are those
that include the word “nigger(s)”. This word is, according to Hosea Easton (1837), “an
opprobrious term, employed to impose contempt upon (blacks) as an inferior race” (as
cited in Kennedy, 2008). The derived index produces a maximum value of 100, which
identifies the highest degree of racial hate.
Taking this variable as a proxy of racial hate has several advantages against approximations
based on surveys. During the sample period, over the 70% of the American population had
access to the internet and, besides, more than 50% of online search in that time were done
through Google. (as cited in Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Moreover, data taken from web
search engines are less prone to be skewed by social censorship. Like internet searches are
mostly individuals, is easier to state an opinion, even if those are socially wrong (as cited
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in Stephen-Davidowitz, 2014).
Also, Rae, Newheiser & Olson (2015) took 890.000 answers across the country of the
“Racial Implicit Association Test”, a test created by Project Implicit which detects au-
tomatic preferences to a race (European American or African American). The authors
validated their results with the one taken from Stephens-Davidowitz (2014). Both ap-
proximations had a positive correlation of 78% with a p-value < 0.001 among Whites
who answered the test and 50% of correlation among Blacks who answered the test (Rae,
Newheiser & Olson, 2015).
To measure the level of corruption by state, this research used a subjective index based
on surveys responded by research journalists in each state (excluding Louisiana that did
not get answers) created by “The Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University” (Dincer
& Johnston, 2015). The index includes values from 1 to 4 of legal and illegal corruption
in the executive, legislative and judicial branch; with corruption increasing with higher
numbers.
Legal corruption is defined as:
“The political gains in the form of campaign contributions or endorsements by a
government official, in exchange for providing specific benefits to private individ-
uals or groups, be it by explicit or implicit understanding”
(Dincer & Johnston, 2015)
Similarly, the definition of illegal corruption is:
“The private gains in the form of cash or gifts by a government official, in exchange
for providing specific benefits to private individuals or groups”
(Dincer & Johnston, 2015)
By distinguishing the level of legal and illegal corruption perception in the branches of
government, this measure collects larger information than other general subjective indices.
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(e.g., Boylan & Long, 2003).
The control variables by state included in the following estimations incorporates some
of the conventional corruption determinants, such as: demographic components (popu-
lation, races proportion and regions1), economic components (GDP per capita and Gini
index), cultural components (protestants and church attendance) and educational com-
ponents (estimated IQ level). Summary statistics of each variable, including sources and
description, are displayed in Table 1.
4. Methodology
With the purpose of measuring and checking the relation among racial hate and corrup-
tion, we construct, according to Jetter & Mesa-Osorio (2016) the following cross sectional
OLS analysis for state i:
Corruption = α0 + αi(Racial hate) + x
′
iα2 + µi (1)
Where x
′
i incorporates the controlled variables described in the previous section.
Taking into account that the dependent variable is a multinomial index, whose options
reflects the perception of corruption of the government branches in each state, the OLS
estimation analysis, although provides the right direction of the effect, the magnitude is
wrong because OLS estimation takes as equivalent the difference between the values of
corruption perception. The fact that the index takes values from one to five, with five as
the highest level of corruption perception, and, therefore ,4 represents lower corruption
than 5, adds useful information that is not possible to take advantage of with OLS or
Ordinal Multinomial Models (Wooldridge, 2010).
For that reason, we are going to estimate an ordered probit model, which is a specific case
of probabilistic choice models. In accordance with Greene (2002) and Wooldridge (2010),
1Region dummies are binary indications for the four U.S. regions (Northeast, South, West, and Midwest
as reference category) as stated by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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an ordered probit model is derived from a latent variable y∗ where:
y∗ = β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk +  (2)
y∗ = x
′
β+  (3)
Assuming that  ∼ N(0, 1) and the observed variable y with J + 1 ordered answers (j =
0, 1, ...J) has the following relationship:
y = 0 if y∗ 6 0,
y = 1 if 0 < y∗ 6 µ1,
y = 1 if µ1 < y
∗ 6 µ2, (4)
...
y = J if µ1 < y
∗ 6 µ2,
Where µ1, . . . , µJ are the threshold parameters of the latent variable y
∗ which delimits
the levels of corruption in every government branch.
Noting that, the probabilities that y = i when (i = 0, 1, ...J), according to Wooldridge
(2010), are:
P(y = 0 | x
′
) = P(y∗ 6 µ1 | x
′
) = P(x
′
β+  6 µ1 | x
′
) = Φ(µ1 − x
′
β) (5)
P(y = 1 | x
′
) = P(y∗ 6 µ2 | x
′
) = P(x
′
β+  6 µ2 | x
′
) = Φ(µ2 − x
′
β) (6)
...
P(y = J− 1 | x
′
) = P(y∗ 6 µJ−1 | x
′
) = P(x
′
β+  6 µJ−1 | x
′
) = Φ(µJ−1 − x
′
β) (7)
P(y = J | x
′
) = P(y∗ 6 µJ | x
′
) = 1−Φ(µJ−1 − x
′
β) (8)
9
Where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function.
Both parameters µi and βi are estimated by maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood
function for each state is:
`i(µ, β) =
1[yi = 0]log[Φ(µ1 − x
′
iβ)]
+1[yi = 1]log[Φ(µ2 − x
′
iβ) −Φ(µ1 − x
′
iβ)] (9)
+...+ 1[yi = J]log[1−Φ(µJ − x
′
iβ)]
Even though the estimated β˜ are going to clarify the effect direction in some cases2(Greene,
2002), the purpose of this methodology is to decode and analyze the partial effects to
changes in the independent variables, which are given by:
∂P(yk = 0 | x
′
)
∂xi
= −βiΦ(µ1 − x
′
β) (10)
∂P(yk = j | x
′
)
∂xi
= βi[Φ(µj−1 − x
′
β) −Φ(µj − x
′
β], para j = 1, 2, ...J− 1 (11)
∂P(yk = J | x
′
)
∂xi
= βiΦ(µJ − x
′
β) (12)
.
This estimated partial effects give us the probability’s variation of the observation i of
changing from one category of the dependent variable (yt) to another.
5. Results and Analysis
Table 2 displays the findings of OLS estimations, including some of the general deter-
minants of corruption as controls, which predicts corruption in the 3 branches of govern-
ment. Columns 1 to 3 assess legal corruption in the judicial branch, whereas columns 4
to 6 estimates illegal corruption in the judicial branch. Column 7 present the result of
2For P(yk = 0 | x
′
) and P(yk = 0 | x
′
), the estimated β˜ contains rightful information of the effect
direction, in the inverse way for the first case and in the direct way in the second one.
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Table 2: Results from OLS robust estimations for 49 states (excluding Louisiana) and 47
states (excluding Louisiana, Alaska and Hawaii).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: Legal Judicial Corruption Illegal Judicial Corruption avg. Judicial Avg. Executive Avg. Legislative
Corruption Corruption Corruption
Racial Hate 3.875*** 2.270* 2.621** 1.906*** 0.971* 1.483*** 2.053*** 3.249** 3.860**
(1.41) (1.21) (1.22) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44) (0.07) (1.53) (1.64)
% Black Race 0.382 -0.097 -0.976 -1.100 -1.380 -2.911*** -1.941 -2.688 0.380
(1.57) (1.49) (1.85) (1.07) (1.07) (1.01) (1.27) (2.03) (2.67)
% White not Hispanic Race -1.163 1.466 -0.142 -1.008 0.542 -1.140 -0.641 -5.043** -2.973
(1.14) (1.25) (1.35) (0.73) (0.96) (0.84) (0.94) (1.98) (2.10)
Estimated IQ Level -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.131*** -0.123*** -0.174*** 0.143* 0.016
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.14)
% Protestant -0.009 1.220* 0.605 -1.350 -1.309
(1.26) (0.61) (0.80) (1.33) (1.33)
Church Attendance -0.123 2.182*** 1.029 4.207** 2.170
(1.75) (0.80) (1.13) (1.91) (1.81)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 49 49 47 49 49 47 47 47 47
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.415 0.438 0.358 0.436 0.562 0.555 0.287 0.411
Notes: White robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Demographic controls includes Ln(Population) and
U.S. regions dummies. Economic controls includes Ln(GDP/capita) and Gini index.
deriving an average of legal and illegal corruption in the same branch. Finally, columns 8
and 9 displays the estimates in average corruption in the executive and legislative branch
respectively. The estimations start with racial hate (our variable of interest) including
demographic and economic controls. Then, we include a set of educational and cultural
controls as well.
Through all estimations, racial hate appears to be a positive predictor of corruption,
with the estimated coefficient being statistically significant at least at 10% level in all the
regressions and statistically significant at 1% level in the illegal and average corruption
in the judicial branch when all controls are included. This findings partially validates the
assumption that are described in the introduction and literature review. The state and
local judicial courts benefits, without an apparent reason rather than their intolerance
against the black population, the white habitants or harm the African-American minority.
In terms of magnitude, one standard deviation of racial hate (0.14), or an increase of
0.14 index level of racial hate, is associated with an increase of 0.36 and 0.20 index points
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in the legal and illegal corruption in the judicial branch respectively. When examined the
average judicial corruption, one standard deviation increase in racial hate represents an
increase of 0.28 index points approximately. Moreover, even if the statistical significance
of racial hate in columns 8 and 9 drops to 5%, the magnitude of the effect is bigger. A
standard deviation increase in racial hate is equivalent to an increase of 0.45 and 0.53
index points of corruption in the executive and legislative branch.
Finally, it is important to consider the highly significant and negative relationship among
IQ level and corruption in the three branches. Just analyzing the column 7 of table 2, an
increase of 1 point in the estimated IQ level of a state, decrease in average 0.225 index
points of the average corruption in the judicial branch, partially validating the findings of
Glaeser (2006).
Although this results are important to validate the relationship between racial hate
and corruption, OLS estimations does not capture whole the information that an ordered
index has (see Section 4). To mitigate this issue, we estimated an ordered probit which is
one case of multinomial ordered model.
Through this probabilistic model, we aim to find the probability’s variation of changing
from one category of corruption perception to another (supposing that the base or initial
category is “Not at all Common”), given an increase of 1% in the independent variable,
which in this case is Racial Hate. As it was stated in methodology, in an ordered probit
model the coefficients of the estimation cannot be fully interpretable. Nevertheless the
estimation results are tabulated in the Appendix as Table 6.
To use this methodological approach, the corruption perception in the three branches
needed to transform, because this variables have not integer values in all the observations.
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Table 3: Marginal effects for average corruption perception in the Judicial branch.
(1) (2) (3)
Corruption Not at all Common Slightly Common Moderately Common
Perception:
Racial Hate -2.605*** 2.024** 0.582*
(1.01) (0.94) (0.34)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Educational Control Yes Yes Yes
Cultural Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 47 47 47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Demographic controls
includes Ln(Population), U.S. regions dummies, % Black race and & White not Hispanic race. Economic controls
includes Ln(GDP/capita) and Gini index. Educational control include estimated IQ level. Cultural controls
includes % Protestants and church attendance.
The general index was modified following the incoming rule:
New Corruption Index = 1 if Old Corruption Index < 1.5,
New Corruption Index = 2 if 6 1.5 Old Corruption Index < 2.5,
New Corruption Index = 3 if 6 2.5 Old Corruption Index < 3.5, (13)
New Corruption Index = 4 if 6 3.5 Old Corruption Index < 4.5,
New Corruption Index = 5 if 6 4.5 Old Corruption Index < 5,
Also, as this variable is the main determinant of this study, the table only includes its par-
tial effects. However, we include the same demographic, economic, educational and cultural
controls included in the OLS estimation (see Table 2) to obtain consistency among all the
estimation approximations. Finally, the three models presented below comply with the as-
sumption of constancy of effects across the different categories. In other words, through a
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likelihood-ratio test, the coefficients of the models are equal across categories (Wolfe, 1997).
Table 3 presents the results of partial effects for the average corruption perception in
the Judicial branch. Knowing that Racial Hate takes values form 0 to 1 and the dependent
variable has a range of values from 1 to 3, an increase of 1% on Racial Hate (or an 0.01
points index) decrease, with a statistical significance of 99%, the probability of a state
i to stay in the same category of lowest level of corruption possible in 2.605%. Instead,
the probability to pass from the base category to “Slightly Common” and “Moderately
Common” increases 2.024% and 0.582% respectively. This findings are highly consistent
with the results from the OLS estimation, which states that a higher value of racial Hate
is related with a higher value of corruption perception.
Table 4: Marginal effects for average corruption perception in the Executive branch.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption Not at all Common Slightly Common Moderately Common Very Common Extremely Common
Perception:
Racial Hate -0.290 -2.765*** 1.565* 1.477** 0.012
(0.26) (1.01) (0.86) (0.59) (0.025)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educational Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 47 47 47 47 47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Demographic controls includes Ln(Population), U.S.
regions dummies, % Black race and & White not Hispanic race. Economic controls includes Ln(GDP/capita) and Gini index. Educational
control include estimated IQ level. Cultural controls includes % Protestants and church attendance.
Tables 4 and 5, which consider the partial effects of Racial Hate on the average per-
ception of corruption in the Executive and Legislative branch respectively, have similar
interpretation as Table 3. With both indices ranging from 1 to 5 in the corruption per-
ception, an increase of 1% in the Racial Hate level in a state i decreases its probability
to stay in the lowest level of corruption perception, and also to move from a “Not at all
14
Table 5: Marginal effects for average corruption perception in the Legislative branch.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption Not at all Common Slightly Common Moderately Common Very Common Extremely Common
Perception:
Racial Hate -0.056 -1.699** -0.490 1.965** 0.289
(0.07) (1.73) (0.47) (0.79) (0.23)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educational Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cultural Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 47 47 47 47 47
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Demographic controls includes Ln(Population), U.S.
regions dummies, % Black race and & White not Hispanic race. Economic controls includes Ln(GDP/capita) and Gini index. Educational
control include estimated IQ level. Cultural controls includes % Protestants and church attendance.
Common” corruption level to “Slightly Common” level. But it increases the probability
of the state to pass from category 1 to a “Moderately” corruption perception or higher.
In the executive branch (see Table 4), with a statically significance of 99%, the prob-
ability of moving towards the second level of corruption decreases in a 2.765% due to an
increase of 0.01 points in Racial Hate; and, with lower levels of statistical significance, in-
crement the probability to move to levels 3 and 4 of corruption perceptions by an 1.565%
and 1.477% respectively. Although the probability to move from the lowest to the highest
level of average corruption in the Executive branch is positive, is very close to zero and
non-significant due to this level has only one observation.
Lastly, the analysis for the average corruption in the Legislative branch presents similar
results to the previous approach with the Executive Branch. The difference lies in that
both magnitude and significance lose some relevance in most of the five categories, except
from the probability to pass from the lowest level possible of corruption to the second
highest. This partial effect is equally significant and approximately 1.3 times bigger than
the one shown in Table 4.
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6. Concluding Remarks
Historically, the United State has suffered several social problems due to intolerance
between races, even though efforts made by the Federal Government to unify its habitants.
Starting with the Civil War and by reason of segregation processes imposed by southern
governments, several non-formal institutions, such as Ku Klux Klan, were founded. This
organizations preached and generated hate against African-Americans, causing inequality
in the education system and the labor market, among others. Nowadays, this disparity
created by those non-formal institutions and implemented by many formal institutions,
is still relevant when finding a reason to fundamental rights violation towards the black
minority across the nation.
Through econometric approximations, including OLS and ordered probit estimations,
we corroborated the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this document, which is the
prevalence of inequality and rights violation because of racial intolerance from the white
majority against black minority. Controlling for general and cultural empirical determi-
nants of corruption, the estimations found a positive and statistically significance relation-
ship between, what we called, racial hate and the perceived corruption levels by state in
the three branches of government (Judicial, Executive and Legislative). Moreover, small
increases of racial intolerance against the black minority increases the probability of a hike
in the perceived corruption up to two categories in the Judicial branch (which index has
only three categories) and up to three categories in the Executive and Legislative branch
in a range of 5 categories.
Despite the inability to analyze the potential damage that can cause racism in the cor-
ruption of the judicial branch in each state, because there is no high perceived corruption,
the fact that the probability to move from the lowest to the highest level of perceived
corruption available is positive and significant, statistically and economically; is worrying
to the American society.
However, an index based on Google search that include the word “nigger(s)” by state
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can include skewed data due the usage level of the n-word among regions. E. j: Southern
states have used this vocabulary to describe contemptuously the Black population since the
XIX century, while Western and Midwestern states’ vocabulary partially included the n-
word more recently. For that reason, Future research should add a better approximation
to racial hate that allows to estimate less skewed results. Also, it would be of great
importance to corroborate the causal effect of this relationship to possibly devise policy
advices that contribute to weaken effectively racism in the country.
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8. Appendix
Table 6: Ordered Probit estimation coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Average Judicial Corruption Average Executive Corruption Average Legislative Corruption
Variables:
Racial Hate 6.797*** 8.747*** 5.969***
(2.69) (2.63) (2.28)
% Black Race -0.396 -7.668*** 1.533
(3.54) (2.78) (3.32)
% White not Hispanic Race -2.073 -12.906*** -1.792
(2.61) (2.80) (2.73)
Estimated IQ Level -0.294** 0.373*** -0.070
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
% Protestant -0.355 -2.282 -2.302
(2.64) (2.11) (1.95)
Church Attendance 3.314 8.305*** 3.445**
(3.07) (2.45) (1.88)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 47 47 47
Pseudo R2 0.396 0.270 0.254
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Demographic controls includes Ln(Population)
and U.S. regions dummies. Economic controls includes Ln(GDP/capita) and Gini index.
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